Why Would Russia Attack a Nuclear Power Plant?
Decoding Putin’s war strategies could either be done applying the Game Theory or they are simply there as preemptive strike
Russia's shelling of the Ukrainian site of Zaporizhzhia, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, shows that the war in Ukraine is rapidly growing more complex and uncertain — but how we arrive at this conclusion is as important as the conclusion itself.
In other words, as I sometimes like to say: Time for some game theory. Specifically, how game theory might apply to nuclear conflict.
Start with the basic logic of deterrence and mutual assured destruction. Russian President Vladimir Putin knows that if he uses nuclear weapons against a NATO or EU member, Ukraine, or even a third country, he will invite a real risk of comparable retaliation. The degree of retaliation is uncertain, perhaps depending on the target. But he does not wish to bear that risk.
Still, Putin would like to find a way of making nuclear threats without quite incurring the liability from … making nuclear threats.
Entre nuclear power plants. When Russian forces attack the plant, there is some chance that something goes wrong, such as a radiation spill. But more likely than not, the plant will hold up, and most dangerous processes can be shut down and the very worst outcomes avoided. You can think of Putin as choosing a "nuclear radiation deployment" with only some small probability.
Why might he do this? Well, he is showing that the use of broader nuclear deployments is not out of the question. He is also showing that he is willing to take a huge risk.
Most of all, he does not have much to fear retaliation. The Western powers cannot know if these nuclear attacks are deliberate strategy or simply an accident of tactics in the field, and so — if only for that reason — they will not respond with a major escalation. If Russian forces moved on Estonia, they might be courting a very serious NATO response. But not in this situation.
You don't have to believe that Putin sat in his lair rubbing his hands as he dreamed up this diabolical strategy. It's also possible that the attack on the nuclear power plant started by mistake, or was ordered by lower-level commanders. Putin then simply allowed it to continue, perhaps out of a general love of chaos. At the very least, he did not consider it a priority to stop the attack.
Game theory doesn't always have to be about explicit plans and intentions. It also can help explain why "invisible hand" mechanisms lead people to a particular point in the strategy tree, as if they had those strategies as conscious intentions.
Attacking the nuclear power plant also illuminates some other parts of game theory. Ukraine and its people are taking very heavy losses and are hoping for NATO to intervene on their behalf. If the conflict seems riskier to all of Europe, and not just Ukraine, the odds of such intervention improve.
In this sense, the attack on the nuclear power plant does not have to be entirely bad for Ukrainian prospects in the war. The Ukrainian leadership is rightly horrified by this attack, due to the risks for Ukrainian citizens. But the attack could also mobilise European public opinion on behalf of military intervention for Ukraine. If the war greatly increases chances for the spread of dangerous nuclear radiation, then the likelihood that Germany, France, Turkey and other nations will intervene also greatly increases.
Notice, however, that the Russian position here may be sounder than it at first appears. European citizens care more about radiation in Ukraine than do American citizens, for reasons of simple proximity. Putin may realise he can put Europeans at greater risk so long as he doesn't provoke an intervention from the U.S. military, which would probably be decisive. It is a risky strategy that he might just get away with.
If you are the Ukrainian government, your incentive is to make the nuclear power plant attack sound as risky and precarious as possible. Indeed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has done exactly that.
The Russian attack also suggests that Russia has stopped trying to win the global propaganda war. Might that herald further Russian atrocities?
I don't think game theory can predict exactly what is coming next. But it is helpful in identifying general patterns and why one side might choose or continue a particular strategy. And right now pretty much all the indicators for this conflict, whether from the news or from game theory, are pointing very strongly negative.
Author's bio: Tyler Cowen is a professor of economics at George Mason University
Disclaimer: This article first appeared on Bloomberg, and is published by special syndication arrangement.
